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VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF JURORS
IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES
ANTHONY C. VANCEt
It was Cambyses II, King of Persia ... who inaugurated
the "twelve-man-jury" 500 years before Christ.
He contended it was necessary for all twelve-good men
and true-serving on jury duty, each to have been born under
one of the 12 Zodiacal Signs, thereby according each member
a different planetary influence enabling them to render a
just verdict.'
IN OUR FEDERAL COURTS, it is not required that the jurors
selected be born under different Zodiacal Signs, but the require-
ment does exist that a jury be fair and impartial, and, as a means of
insuring this, the law provides for the examination of prospective
jurors either by court, counsel, or both. Most successful trial lawyers
will agree that the selection of a jury represents one of the most
important phases of the trial of a case. At a minimum, this process
should be utilized to eliminate those prospective jurors who, because
of their environment, inheritance, or peculiar experience, would be
inexorably prejudiced or unfair. For the astute advocate, more than
this bare minimum is devoutly desired. Thus, the voir dire examina-
tion may afford the trial lawyer an opportunity to introduce both
himself and the justiciableness of his case; to engender the feeling of
friendship, understanding, and respect; and, to lay an important tactical
foundation for any adverse features of his case. The purpose of this
article will be to explore the statutes and rules concerning jury selection
in federal civil cases, the scope of permitted areas of jury examination,
challenges, and the manner of exercising the same, and the effect of
false or erroneous juror answers on voir dire.
t Associate in the firm of Turney, Major, Markham & Sherfy, Washington, D.C.
B.S., 1954, Pennsylvania State University; LL.B., 1960, George Washington Univer-
sity.
1. McCready, Challenging Jurors, 58 DIcK. L. &~v. 384 (1954). For an ex-
cellent discussion concerning the origin of trial by jury see Palmer, On Trial:
The Jury Trial, 20 F.R.D. 65-70 (1958); cf. Knox, Jury Selection, 22 N.Y.U.L.Q.
433 (1947).
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EXAMINATION OF JURORS
A FEDERAL RIGHT
The seventh amendment2 to the federal constitution embodies the
basis of the right to a trial by jury in a federal civil case. Unlike the
sixth amendment, which applies to criminal cases, the seventh amend-
ment does not expressly provide for an impartial jury. But it is clear
that the common law had previously incorporated the requirement of
impartiality3 into its fabric and it is, of course, implicit in the fifth
amendment's requirement of "due process of law."4 The provisions
of the seventh amendment have been preserved in Rule 38 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'
Rule 476 vests the trial judge with the choice of personally examin-
ing prospective jurors on voir dire, or permitting counsel to conduct
the same, or to combine the two methods. Thus, it is readily seen that
much discretion is placed in the trial judge with regard to the manner
in which zoir dire will be conducted and the exercise of this discretion
has been the topic of considerable controversy.7 Those in favor of
abolishing interrogation by counsel argue that the interests of fairness
and trial expediency require that the court, and not counsel, propound
questions to the entire panel, deviating only on occasion to query an
2. "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved .... U . S. CONST. amend VII.
3. Thiel v. So. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1945); Geagan v. Gavin, 292 F.2d
244, 249 (1st Cir. 1961); Consolidated Gas & Equipment Co. v. Carver, 257 F.2d
111, 115 (10th Cir. 1958) ; Andrews v. Hotel Sherman, Inc., 138 F.2d 524, 527 (7th
Cir. 1943); Lay v. J. M. McDonald, 24 F.R.D. 36, 38 (D. Colo. 1959), appeal
dismissed, 274 F.2d 827 (10th Cir.); De Carlo v. Sears Roebuck Co., 98 F. Supp.
608 (W.D. Pa. 1951) ; cf. Baltimore & C. Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935).
4. Report of The Judicial Conference Committee on The Operation of The
Jury System, 26 F.R.D. 411, 465 (1961).
5. Note that FED. R. Civ. P. 39(c) affords a certain degree of flexibility in that
the trial judge may utilize an advisory jury on any issue, whether or not trial by
jury as a matter of right, and if the parties consent, a finding by such a jury has the
same effect as if a trial by jury had been as a matter of right.
6. FED R. Civ. P. 47. Note that prior to adoption of the Federal Rules several
federal courts had embraced the practice of conducting the voir dire and such
practice was upheld whenever attacked. Falter v. United States, 23 F.2d 420, 426
(2d Cir. 1928) ; Carroll v. United States, 16 F.2d 951, 955 (2d Cir. 1927);
Bradshaw v. United States, 15 F.2d 970, 971 (9th Cir. 1926); Moore, Voir Dire
Examination of Jurors, 17 Gio. L.J. 13, 14 (1928).
7. E.g., NIZER, My LIFE IN COURT 35 (1961) ("I consider this a serious
setback. I like to question juro's myself.") ; Holtzoff, How Courtroom Procedure
May Be Expedited, 14 F.R.D. 323, 325-26 (1954) ;' FLAHERTY, 4 DISTRICT OF COLUM-
BIA PRACTICE 388 (1949) ("The majority of judges appear to favor the method
whereby the attorneys . . . conduct the . . . voir dire. This method is probably
superior because it is more convenient, saves time, and permits a more thorough
injuiry into the disqualifications of jurors.") ; Goodman, The New Spirit in Federal
Court Procedure, 7 F.R.D. 449, 451 (1947) ("There can be no doubt that simplicity,
fairness and speed result from the judge's examination of prospective jurors.");
BREWSTER, TWELVE MEN IN A Box 46 (1934) ("This not only saves time, but pro-
tects the juror from some ... disagreeable experiences . . . .") Note that Judge Kerr,
Empaneling of a Jury, 28 F.R.D. 185, 188 (1961), cites statistics revealing that
in Fifty-one districts the judges conduct all examinations, in twenty-two districts the
judge and counsel both ask questions, and in twelve districts the examination is
conducted solely by counsel.
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individual panelist where the exigencies of clarification so demand.'
In this author's opinion, any such exercise of discretion which com-
pletely precludes counsel's personal examination of prospective jurors
loses sight of the fundamental purpose of voir dire, viz., to perceptibly
evaluate a juror's leanings or prejudices in order to form a rationale
basis for the exercise of challenge. Moreover, it is only logical that he
who must exercise the challenge be permitted to probe for the bias
he regards most detrimental to his case. Mr. Nizer's succinct comments
in this regard quite aptly express the justification for this position:
By speaking individually to each juror, one can get behind the
face's mask. . . . The voice and diction are always revealing.
During personal questioning one may sense a sympathetic bond
or conversely, resistance. . . . But when a number of jurors
merely shake their collective heads in answer to the Judge's formal
questions, observation gives very limited clues.9
Furthermore, it is believed that the questionable objection of "trial
expediency" 1 is not of sufficient import to merit the conclusion that
the court should decide, and quite frequently on a collective basis, the
leanings or prejudices of the panelists. Thus, it is believed that the only
veritable objection to counsel's conducting the voir dire-fairness--can
be surmounted by ardent court scrutiny, as such similar objections are
overcome in other phases of the trial of a case. It should also be kept
in mind that empaneling a jury is the first important1' portion of the
persuasive process and if our commitment to the adversary system,
as the best available method of determining truth, is valid, it would
appear to be inconsistent to remove this phase of the case from the
immediate control of the advocates.
QUALIFICATIONS AND SUMMONING
OF FEDERAL JURORS
Prior to 1948, the law provided that jurors summoned to serve
in the federal courts "shall have the same qualifications . . . and be
8. Holtzoff, How Courtroom Procedure May Be Expedited, supra note 7; see
also, Peck, Do Juries Delqy Justice, 18 F.R.D. 455 (1956); but see, Comment, 56
MicH. L. RPv. 954, 956-57 (1960), wherein the author suggests legislation for an
effective form of prior juror screening to remedy the time deficiencies complained
of. 9. My Lips IN CoURT, supra note 7, at 35-36. Note that another leading trial
lawyer goes even further and supports personal examination by counsel because he
would otherwise be denied "the opportunity to meet and impress those who will
become the 'triers of the facts' with the justiciableness of one's cause." BELLI, 1
MODERN TRIALS 796 (1954).
10. In one recent criminal case in the District of Columbia, a Municipal Court
Judge disqualified himself from conducting a jury trial because, among.other irri-
tations, the twenty minute length of the voir dire examination was excessive. Wash-
ington Post, Apr. 13, 1962, § B, p. 6, col. 1.
11. See 4 SCHWEITZER, CYCLOPEDIA or TRIAL PRACTICE 2007 (1954).
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entitled to the same exemptions, as jurors of the highest court of law in
such state. .. ."I' The Judicial Code of 1948,"3 though abandoning
the conformity requirement of qualifications and exemptions, retained
the restriction that a person who is incompetent to serve as a juror by
the law of the state in which the federal district court was held, shall
also be incompetent to serve as a juror in that district court. In 1957 the
mandatory use of state standards as to juror competency was abolished.
Thus, today the sole minimum qualifying standards of federal jurors
are: (a) United States citizenship; (b) twenty-one years of age; (c)
have resided in the particular judicial district for one year; (d) not be
convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year, unless his civil rights have been restored by pardon or amnesty;
(e) be able to read, write, understand, and speak the English language:
and (f) not be incapable, by reason of mental or physical informity,
to render efficient jury service. 14
The federal district court clerks and court appointed jury com-
missioners are responsible 5 for the selection of federal jurors and the
methods of selection so utilized are left to their sole discretion. 16 Thus,
it is in this manner and upon these minimal qualifications that federal
jurors are "selected," and as the voir dire examination is commenced.
those who are unsuitable or partial will be "rejected" by challenge."
CHALLENGES AND METHODS OF EXCLUSION
As at common law, the method of eliminating prejudiced jurors
and of achieving an impartial jury is by challenge."8 Challenges "for
12. This provision originated in Section 29 of the Judiciary Act of September
24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 88 and was incorporated in Section 275 of the Judicial
Code of 1911, 36 Stat. 1164.
13. 62 Stat. 951 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1950).
14. 71 Stat. 638 (1957), 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1961).
15. 62 Stat. 952, 28 U.S.C. § 1864 (1948).
16. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946); Dow v. Carnegie-
Illinois Steel Corp., 224 F.2d 414, 424 (3d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 971.
But the jurors must be both representative [Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130
(1940)] and drawn from a cross section of the community. [Thiel v. Southern
Pac. Co., supra.] Regardless of the method used, the federal selectors may not
systematically exclude any recognizable class or group. Hernandez v. Texas, 347
U.S. 475 (1954) (exclusion of Mexicans); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., supra
(exclusion of daily wage earners); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946)
(exclusion of women) ; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (exclusion
of Negroes).
17. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71 (1887) ("The right to challenge is the
right to reject, not to select a juror."); Hall v. United States, 168 F.2d 161, 164
(D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 853. See Note, 58 YAL4 L.J. 638, 639
(1949).
18. Voir dire is unquestionably the least expensive method of acquiring informa-
tion to form a basis for the exercise of challenge. A more expensive manner of
acquiring such information is by independent and private investigation, conducted
prior to trial. Even assuming that this method is within the bounds of one's right to
privacy, it is doubtful that many cases would justify this process of educating coun-
sel. See MOSCHZISKR, TRIAL By JURY, § 120 (2d ed. 1930).
FALL 1962]
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cause" must be upon grounds of absolute disqualification19 and will
lie if legally cognizable evidence of partiality is submitted, and, of
course, such challenges are unlimited in number. Unlike the early
common law, each party to a civil suit is entitled to three peremptory
challenges, and in cases involving more than one plaintiff or defendant,
the court may, in its discretion,2" allow additional peremptory chal-
lenges and permit them to be exercised jointly or separately. 2' Thus,
peremptories permit further rejection of jurors for a real or imagined
partiality that is less easily designated and proved than challenges for
cause. In passing, it should be noted that the grounds for challenge
and the methods utilized for exercising the same in state courts need
not be followed in the respective federal courts,2  and a contrary practice
is quite often found.
There would appear to be little variation in the method of ex-
cluding jurors for cause, since here, after grounds are established,
counsel merely discreetly requests the court to excuse the juror chal-
lenged. It is in the area of the peremptory challenge that variations
appear. Perhaps in most instances peremptory challenges are exercised
alternatively by counsel. This method has the advantage of avoiding
any loss of challenges by duplication; the possible disadvantage is
that it may work to the challenger's detriment in that it does not
prevent prospective jurors from discovering which party challenged a
particular venireman. Another method utilized is for counsel to simul-
taneously strike, from a list, the names peremptorily challenged and
the remaining names are submitted to the court and constitute the
panel from which the jury is selected. The possible advantage in
19. United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 135 (1936) ; Kempe v. United States,
160 F.2d 406, 409 (8th Cir. 1947). ". . . A challenge 'for favor' means for bias or
prejudice." Ibid. In 3 BI. Comm. 363 (Lewis' ed. 1902) Blackstone stated that:
"A principal challenge is such where the cause assigned carries with it prima fade
evident marks of suspicion either of malice or favour; as ...that he has an in-
terest in the cause .. .that he is the party's master, servant ...or of the same
... corporation . . .all these are principal causes of challenge; which if true can-
not be overruled, for jurors must be omni exceptione majores."
20. Note that the exercise of this discretion is reviewable where the record
discloses an improper or unreasonable exercise of the same. Globe Indemnity Co.
v. Stringer, 190 F.2d 1017, 1018 (5th Cir. 1951).
21. 73 Stat. 565 (1959), 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1961). In Signal Mountain Portland
Cement Co. v. Brown, 141 F.2d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 1944), it was held that
limiting the defendants to three peremptory challenges was reversible error where
five cases, brought by separate plaintiffs, were tried together and not consolidated.
See also, Matanuska Val. Lines v. Neal, 255 F.2d 632, 635-636 (9th Cir. 1957),
where three separate actions, against two defendants, were consolidated, held,
no error in refusing defendants more than three peremptory challenges.
22. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 406, 407 (1894) ; Franzen v. Chi.
M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 278 Fed. 370, 372 (7th Cir. 1921) ; United States v. Davis,
103 Fed. 457 (D. Tenn. 1900); aff'd, 107 Fed. 753; BARRON & HoLTZoFr, 2B
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCMDURs 322-333 (1961) ; Steckler, Management of The
Jury, 28 F.R.D. 190, n. 1 (1961).
23. See Note, 58 YALE L.J. 638, 644 (1949).
[VOL. 8: p. 76
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utilizing this method is that the remaining jurors are unaware of which
advocate "struck" which juror, or at least so attempted; the dis-
advantage is that by simultaneous striking, there may be duplication
and hence squandered challenges.24
In passing, it should be noted that, whatever the order of challenge,
most courts agree that it is waived if not timely invoked, 5 and similarly,
a party cannot object to the overruling of a challenge for cause so long
as the objection could be removed by the exercise of a remaining
peremptory challenge. 6
PERMITTED AREAS OF EXAMINATION
It is axiomatic that the scope of the voir dire examination is
entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court and any decision
touching upon these matters will be undisturbed in the absence of an
abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding that the permitted area of
examination continues to develop on a case-by-case basis, there are
generally well settled topics which may be explored.2
Prior Knowledge Of The Facts
"Impartiality," the United States Supreme Court has said,'
means that a juror must be indifferent as he stands unsworn. It is
not required, however, that jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and
issues involved. 0 Thus, a prospective juror is not per se disqualified
from service merely because he has acquired an outside knowledge of
such matters, 3 1 but such prior knowledge, whether its source be a
24. This method does not appear to be in conflict with Section 1870 of the
Judicial Code, supra note 21. Ibid.
25. St. Clair v. United States, 154 U.S. 134, 147-148 (1894) ; Cox v. General
Electric Co., 302 F.2d 389, 391 (6th Cir. 1962) ; Bastell v. United States, 217 F.2d
257, 260 (8th Cir. 1954); Carruthers v. Reed, 102 F.2d 933, 939 (8th Cir. 1939),
cert. denied, 307 U.S. 643; cf., City of Villa Rica v. Couch, 281 F.2d 284, 291
(5th Cir. 1960) ; Morton v. Welch, 162 F.2d 840, 842 (4th Cir. 1947) ; cert. denied,
332 U.S. 779; Union Elec. L. & P. Co. v. Snyder Estate Co., 65 F.2d 297, 301
(8th Cir. 1933).
26. Jordan v. United States, 295 F.2d 355, 356 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
82 S. Ct. 479 (1962).
27. Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 413 (1895) ; Spells v. United
States, 263 F.2d 609, 612 (5th Cir. 1959); Smedra v. Stanek, 187 F.2d 892, 895
(10th Cir. 1951).
28. See also 49 Thoughts On Jury Selection, 17 Tn. YOUNG LAWYER No. 3 at 2,
7 (ABA, 1961), for some recommended "tips" in conducting the voir dire.
29. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 154 (1878); Beck v. United States,
298 F.2d 622, 628 (9th Cir. 1962).
30. Irvin v. Doud, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1960). See also, United States v.
Kahaner, 204 F. Supp. 921, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
31. Union Electric L. & P. Co. v. Snyder Estate Co., supra note 25. See also,
Blumenfield v. United States, 284 F.2d 46, 51 (8th Cir. 1960); United States
v. Kahaner, supra note 30; but see United States v. Milanovich, 303 F.2d 626, 629
(4th Cir. 1962).
FALL 1962]
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newspaper account3 2 or conversation, 3 furnishes counsel with an oppor-
tunity to interrogate as to the prejudicial effect that such knowledge
might have on a prospective juror's verdict. And if he expresses an
"entire willingness as well as an ability" to accept the facts as developed
by the evidence, and to render a verdict accordingly, a challenge for
cause will not lie.34 A juror's mere possession of prior knowledge
should be distinguished from the situation where he has both "formed
and expressed" an opinion about the issues of a case, because in this
posture he is ordinarily regarded as disqualified.3"
Acquaintanceship And Family Relationship
The rule appears to be that a juror is not per se dis-
qualified because of extended acquaintanceship with the attor-
ney advocating a cause, and the striking of such a juror is
held improper. 6 Even the fact that a prospective juror was previ-
ously involved with counsel in litigation has been stated as being
insufficient to challenge for cause. 7 It was similarly ruled in Kelly v.
Gulf Oil Co. 8 that a juror was not disqualified because of acquaintance-
ship, or even a professional relationship with a witness for a party
litigant. But the rule is contra if a juror is related to an employee of
a party litigant for here the policy of an "uncompromising atmosphere
of impartiality" is pursued and jurors should be removed for cause if
"any possible cloud of bias might arise due to the intimacies of family
relationship.
'39
32. Rizzo v. United States, 304 F.2d 810, 815-16 (8th Cir. 1962); Tallant
Transfer Co. v. Bingham, 216 F.2d 245, 247 (4th Cir. 1954) ; See also United States
v. Smith, 306 F.2d 596, 604 (2d Cir. 1962).
33. Union Gold Mining Co. v. Rocky Mountain Nat'l Bank, 98 U.S. 640, 642(1877).
34. Ibid.
35. United States v. Wallace, 201 F.2d 65, 67 (10th Cir. 1952) ; Union Elec.
L. & P. Co. v. Snyder Estate Co., supra Note 25; Horsley, The Jury Voir Dire, 26
INS. COUNSEL J. 284, 285-286 (1959) (". . . where a juror states he has such an
opinion, and that it is unqualified or fixed opinion . . .it is generally recognized that
such is a valid ground of challenge for cause.") ; cf., Reynolds v. United States, supra
Note 29, at 157. But see United States v. Milanovich, supra note 31 ("If the
publication is shown to have reached the prospective jurors, they should be excused
if there is any doubt about their partiality.").
36. Peerless Ins. Co. v. Schnauder, 290 F.2d 607, 610 (5th Cir. 1961)
Chicago B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Conway, 29 F.2d 551, 552 (8th Cir. 1928); See also
United States v. Smith, note 32 supra (defense counsel).
37. Carpenter v. United States, 100 F.2d 716, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
38. 28 F. Supp. 205, 207 (E.D. Pa. 1.938) (". . . such knowledge would assist
the juror in appraising the credibility of the witness.") aff'd, 105 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir.
1939). See also United States v. Smith, note 32 supra ("It has never been supposed
that mere acquaintance with those involved [the deceased or the defendant] in a
criminal case was by itself a disqualification for jury duty.") ; Swallow v. United
States, 307 F.2d 81, 84 (10th Cir. 1962).
39. Dotson v. Penna. RR. Co., 142 F. Supp. 509, 511 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
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Business Relationship With The Parties
There is, of course, a firm impression that a juror who has a
business relationship with one of the parties (including the real party
in interest), or a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the suit, will
be biased. The general rule in this regard is illustrated by the statement
enunciated in Eppinger & Russell Co. v. Sheely :40
A party litigant has the right to inquire in good faith whether a
prospective juror is interested in the result of the suit by reason of
business relations with the adversary party, in order that he may
exercise intelligently his privilege of peremptory challenge, or dis-
close such interest as would afford ground of challenge for cause.
There seems to be little question concerning the right to challenge
for cause a prospective juror who is in the private employ of a party,41
or of the real party in interest, 42 because such a juror is per se thought
incompetent to sit. In D. C. Transit System, Inc. v. Slingland,43 where
the United States was a party defendant, it was held that error was
not committed in denying defendant Transit's request for a new jury
panel because of the presence of sixteen government employees among
the twenty-four prospective jurors. Here, the court cited United States
v. Wood :4 "We think the imputation of bias simply by virtue of
government employment, without regard to any actual partiality . . .
rests on an assumption without any rational foundation." It was
held that this proposition was applicable to civil as well as criminal
cases. Thus, the rule appears to be that disqualification only lies in
nongovernmental employment situations, but query, if the rationale of
Wood is sound, should bias be ipso facto imputed in all private
employment situations, including large corporations?
Other than employment, it is also desirable to exclude prospective
jurors who have a pecuniary interest in or a business relationship
with one of the real parties in interest. Pursuing such a desirable
objective, however, may collide with the right of an opposing party not
to have prospective jurors prejudiced against him. An illustration of
this conflict occurs in personal injury cases wherein the defendant is
protected by liability insurance. The legality and the tactical advantage
of injecting insurance into such a case have given rise to a number of
decisions on this point, in addition to conflicting comments from the
40. 24 F.2d 153, 154 (5th Cir. 1928); cf., Spells v. United States, 263 F.2d
609, 611 (5th Cir. 1959).
41. Francone v. Southern Pac. Co., 145 F.2d 732, 733 (5th Cir. 1945); cf.
Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 182, 196 (1908).
42. Anderson v. Todd Shipyard Co., 63 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
43. 266 F.2d 465, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
44. 299 U.S. 123, 149 (1936).
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trial bar. Thus, notwithstanding that a juror's relationship in this
regard may be too remote to challenge for cause, counsel may desire to
exclude the juror by the exercise of peremptory challenge. The general
rule seems to be that provided counsel acts in good faith, he may, in
one form or another, question prospective jurors on voir dire respecting
their interest in, or connection with, liability insurance companies.
In Eppinger & Russell Co. v. Sheely,45 plaintiff's counsel, on voir
dire, asked whether any of the jurors were engaged in the casualty
insurance business. Whether or not the defendant was in fact protected
by liability insurance was not previously disclosed. After a verdict for
the plaintiff, the defendant appealed, citing this question as a ground
therefor. In affirming the judgment, the Sixth Circuit treated this
question as one asked in good faith and for the purpose of inquiring
into the business relationship with one of the real parties in interest.
With regard to the fact that the question might have prejudiced the
defendant, who may or may not have been insured, the court stated
that the defendant had the burden of proving that no surety was
involved in order to avoid possible injury or prejudice. The court
apparently overlooked the fact that if no juror was acquainted with
either of the parties it would be virtually impossible to know whether
insurance was involved, and a priori, absent an assumption in this
respect, there appeared to be no need to propound such a question.
The Tenth Circuit in Sn:edra v. Stanek,46 and the Ninth Circuit
in Duff v. Page4" apparently took this approach, for both stated that
the refusal to interrogate the jurors with respect to a specified insur-
ance company was not error since there was no showing on the record
that any juror was cognizant of the fact that the specified insurance
company was interested in the suit. The Fourth Circuit apparently
agreed in Hebron v. Brown,48 for here it was stated that interrogation
of jurors as to their indebtedness to a bank was properly excluded
since the bank president, even though a senior partner of the law firm
representing a party litigant, did not personally appear in court.
With respect to interrogating counsel to determine whether an
insurance company was interested in the case, the Tenth Circuit, in
Bass v. Dehner,49 stated that though it was proper to interrogate the
jurors with respect to their interest in or connection with indemnity
45. Supra Note 40, at 154-155.
46. 187 F.2d 892, 895 (10th Cir. 1951).
47. 249 F.2d 137, 140 (9th Cir. 1959) ; In the District of Columbia, interrogation
on voir dire as to matters of insurance is stated to be grounds for a mistrial.
BARRON & HOLTzoFr, 2 B. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 321, n. 1 (1961).
48. 248 F.2d 798, 799 (4th Cir. 1957).
49. 103 F.2d 28, 36 (10th Cir. 1939) ; cert. denied, 308 U.S. 580.
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EXAMINATION OF JURORS
insurance"° companies, it was improper to interrogate defendant's
counsel for the purpose of obtaining a basis for questioning jurors as
to their connection with such insurance companies. But the Eighth
Circuit in Wagner Electric Co. v. Snowden,5 stated that such an
inquiry of counsel was permissible and if the question was declined by
him, then "certainly the jurors could not have been prejudiced" by
interrogation as to a specified insurance company.
In Martin v. Burgess,12 the Fifth Circuit stated that the question
of whether an insurance company would be affected by the result of
the trial should be privately ascertained, without needlessly publish-
ing the fact of insurance. It further stated that, upon plaintiff's request,
jurors "interested" in the insured should be excluded. The court did
not reveal or expound upon the method to be utilized in eliminating
such jurors without "publishing the fact" of insurance.
The lower court in Bramen v. Wiley,53 overruled defendant's
motion that any juror's connection with an insurance company be
first ascertained by inquiring if any juror was connected with any
corporation, and if an affirmative response, then to determine if it be
an insurance company, then the name of the company, and then the
juror's connection therewith. Instead, the court proceeded to inter-
rogate each juror as to whether or not he had automobile insurance
and if so the name of the company. The defendant ululated error!
The Seventh Circuit, in affirming the lower court's ruling, innocuously
retorted "we do not believe that its import is as serious as claimed
by the defendant."
It is submitted that the rulings in Smedra and Duff are indeed
questionable since in this day and age, even conceding that all defen-
dants are not protected by indemnity insurance companies, the fact
of the matter is that most jurors lean toward the assumption of defen-
dant insurance coverage. Thus, the specious dialectics of the Ninth
and Tenth Circuits appear to exalt idealism over reality. The ruling
of Bass is equally questionable, for notwithstanding the impropriety
of interrogating defendant's counsel as to insurance matters, it appears
that if "good faith" is present, counsel may interrogate the jurors in
any event. What can the defendant lose by making such a disclosure?
He can gain the preclusion of possible jury prejudice by avoiding the
injection of insurance if he is not in fact insured! The ruling of
50. Ibid. (E.g., "[Do] you own any of the stock or bonds of American Mutual
Liability Company of Boston?")
51. 38 F.2d 599, 600 (8th Cir. 1930).
52. 82 F.2d 321, 324 (5th Cir. 1936).
53. 119 F.2d 991, 993 (7th Cir. 1941); but see, Andrews v. Hotel Sherman,
138 F.2d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 1943) ("... it all depends upon good faith of counsel and
the fair requirements of the case.")
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Bramen is illustrative of the opposite extreme and indicates the need
for a rational procedure at the trial level to better ascertain the
existence of "good faith."
Lentner v. Lieberstein54 alluded to such a procedure. Here, plain-
tiff's counsel inquired of four female jurors whether their husbands
were in any way connected with any insurance company. The question
was negatively answered and defendant's objection to further pursuit
of questions along such lines was sustained. In affirming this ruling
the rejuvenated Seventh Circuit stated:
• . . voir dire . . .must be undertaken in good faith, and not
merely to convey "to the jury information that an insurance com-
pany was standing in the background" . . . . [Wheeler v. Rudek,
397 Il. 438, 442, 74 N.E.2d 601, 603 (1947).]
Here plaintiff made no showing of cause why the excluded
line of voir dire interrogation was necessary."
The court also noted the procedure followed in Illinois to ascertain
whether such good cause existed. The procedure is essentially that
followed in the Rudek case,5 as the court observes. Before empanel-
ment of the jury, plaintiff should request and the court should conduct
a hearing and rule whether plaintiff might ask each juror whether he
is interested in any insurance company. This ruling is to be based
upon an affidavit submitted by plaintiff which states that the defendant's
insurer has a large number of agents and employees in the particular
area and that the plaintiff has reason to believe that persons who might
have an interest in the insurance company might be among the panel
of jurors called to try the case and that the plaintiff fears that he would
not have a fair trial unless he were able to examine each juror on voir
dire as to his connection with any insurance company.
This procedure is, of course, an improvement over none at all, if
merely because some common thread of consistency is afforded at the
trial level. But the "good cause" 7 standard, in affidavit form, could
possibly impose an additional investigative burden on counsel desiring
to so interrogate. Thus, one of the outstanding advantages of the
voir dire examination-the preclusion of time-consuming and ex-
pensive private investigation to procure information for challenge-
would be forfeited if such an adopted standard were strictly construed.
On the other hand, a liberal construction of such a standard might open
54. 279 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1960).
55. Id. at 387.
56. Wheeler v. Rudek, 397 Ill. 438, 74 N.E.2d 601 (1947). cf., Spells v. United
States, 263 F.2d 609, 611 (5th Cir. 1959).
57. For an excellent annotation dealing with conduct by counsel which has
been held to constitute good faith see Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 761, 798 (1949).
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the flood-gates, and counsel, under the guise of "fear and belief," might
have an avenue available for the speculative injection of insurance
matters. This author does not pretend to offer a solution, but he does
feel that more recognition should be given to the problem. And, while
more thought is given to furnishing a paragon of procedure in this
regard, the practice of placing the burden on counsel to reveal, in
court, whether or not indemnity insurance is involved, as followed in
Eppinger, might at least minimize the problem to some extent, for if
no indemnity insurance is in fact protecting the defendant, he can lose
nothing by so stating and in this manner can at least obviate "good
faith" fishing expeditions in this area.
Undue Faith in Testimony of Certain Witnesses
Another permitted area of examination is the reliance that jurors
may place upon the testimony of particular witnesses simply because
of the status of the occupation of such a witness. Most of these cases
have developed in the criminal area but the principles are equally
applicable to civil actions whenever a cause for one of the parties
hinges to a large extent upon such testimony.
In Sellers v. United States," the trial judge, who conducted the
voir dire, refused to ask whether any of the jurors were inclined to
give more weight to the testimony of a police officer, merely because
of his occupation, than to that of other appearing witnesses. The
prosecution's case rested almost entirely upon the testimony of the
officer and on appeal from a conviction, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held that the refusal to ask the question on
voir dire was reversible error. The court recognized the broad dis-
cretion a trial judge possesses in this regard, but stated that this dis-
cretion was subject to the essential demands of fairness.
The limitation imposed in this area was articulated in the case of
Chavez v. United States,9 in which the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
refusal of the trial judge to ask whether the jury would give more
weight to the testimony of law officers than the testimony of the
defendant. The court stated that the jury would be justified in believ-
ing the word of an officer over the self-serving testimony of the
defendant and that "voir dire . . . cannot search the result of the case
in advance."6 This Court agreed that it would have been proper for
the trial court, if requested, to have interrogated as to whether the
58. 271 F.2d 475 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
59. 258 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, sub nom. Tenorio v. United States,
359 U.S. 916 (1959).
60. Id. at 819.
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jury would give greater or less weight to the testimony of a law
enforcement officer, simply because of the witness' official character,
than to that of other appearing witnesses. In the words of the court:
"A defendant cannot be fairly tried by a juror who would be inclined
to give unqualified credence to a law enforcement officer simply be-
cause he is an officer. '
61
Thus, if in any civil case it appears that one's case rests heavily
upon the testimony of an officer or any other person of similar status,
it would seem that a tactical advantage could be gained by posing such
a question to the jurors in the aspiration that they would do their
utmost to render a fair verdict, after affirming their disinclination to
give undue weight to such testimony.
Other Areas of Inquiry
In addition to the above permitted areas of inquiry, it is also
proper to interrogate as to whether any panelists, 2 or members of
their family, 63 ever sustained injuries of the type in issue, or ever
filed claims 64 or previously instituted or defended an action 61 for per-
sonal injuries. It is also permissible to inquire into their occupations66
and whether any have served on a petit jury at any term held within
one year of the instant trial. In at least one case, Evening Star
Newspaper Co. v. Gray,68 it was held that the mentioning of the ad
damnurn, in the course of interrogating a female panelist on voir dire
as to the occupation of her husband, was not grounds for a mistrial.
In proper cases, racial, religious, economic, social, or political prejudices
of the prospective jurors are also allowable subjects of inquiry. 9 Other
available areas are dependent upon the subject matter of the suit and
the parties litigant, keeping in mind that the scope of examination
should be broad enough to permit intelligent exercise of the peremptory
challenge.
61. Ibid.
62. Truitt v. Travellers Ins. Co., 175 F. Supp. 67 (S.D. Tex. 1959), aff'd, 280
F.2d 784; Lay v. J. M. McDonald Co., 24 F.R.D. 36, 37 (D. Colo. 1959), appeal
dismissed, 274 F.2d 827.
63. Johnson v. Hill, 274 F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1960).
64. Stanczak v. Penn. RR. Co., 174 F.2d 43 (7th Cir. 1949); Orenberg v.
Thecker, 143 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
65. Consolidated Gas & Equipment Co. v. Carver, 257 F.2d 111 (10th Cir.
1958); For further amplification of the reasoning behind this line of questions, see
4 SCHWEITZER, CYCLOPEDIA OF TRIAL PRACTICE, 2024 (1954).
66. Howser v. Pearson, 95 F. Supp. 936 (D.D.C. 1951). It is generally
agreed that law enforcers, claim adjusters, credit and insurance men, etc. are poor
prospective jurors from a plaintiff's point of view. GOLDSTtIN, TRIAL TACTics at
157 (1935).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1869 (1950), 62 Stat. 953 (1948).
68. 179 A.2d 377 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1962).
69. Annot., 72 A.L.R.2d 905 (1960) ; see Note, 37 N.D. L. REv. 383 (1961).
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FAILURE TO RESPOND
The right of rejection of jurors would indeed be illusory unless
the jurors responded to the interrogation submitted, and in responding,
answered truthfully and not erroneously to the questions propounded.7 °
As a rule, knowledge of concealment or falsity is not obtained by
counsel for the losing party until after an adverse verdict has been
rendered. The question then arises as to the remedy counsel has
available.
Usually, a motion for a new trial is made and it is then necessary
to determine whether the failure of the juror to disclose fully the
information sought warrants setting aside the verdict.71 The general
rule is that the complaining party must show that such conduct was
prejudicial.12 Moreover, prejudicial conduct cannot be claimed where
counsel, at the time of voir dire," or before verdict," had possession
of the information which a correct answer to the question propounded
would have disclosed.
In ruling on whether to grant a new trial, the courts will look to
the prejudicial nature of the questions answered wrongfully,7" whether
innocently or inadvertently given or withheld,76 whether the questions
were propounded to the array or directed to an individual venireman,"
and the technicality of the language used in addressing the interroga-
tories to the panelists. In Orenberg v. Thecker,7" the questions pro-
pounded contained the words "claim" and "personal injuries" and the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in ruling that inappropriate
juror silence to questions utilizing such words was not concealment
of material information, stated:
70. See Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 624 (1954).
71. See Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1061 (1959).
72. Johnson v. Hill, 274 F.2d 110, 116 (8th Cir. 1960); Consolidated Gas
& Equip. Co. v. Carver, 257 F.2d 111, 115 (10th Cir. 1958) ; Stanczak v. Penn.
RR. Co., 174 F.2d 43, 48 (7th Cir. 1949) ; Orenberg v. Thecker, 143 F.2d 375
(D.C. Cir. 1944); Truitt v. Travellers Ins. Co., 175 F. Supp. 67, 72 (S.D. Tex.
1959), aff'd, 280 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Lay v. J. M. McDonald Co., 24 F.R.D.
36, 38 (D. Colo. 1959), appeal dismissed, 274 F. 2d 827 (10th Cir. 1959) ; note 70
supra, at 627.
73. Johnson v. Hill, supra note 72.
74. Stanczak v. Penn. R.R. Co., supra note 72. ("... the law is well established
that a party cannot gamble with the possibility of verdict and thereafter, when the
verdict proves unfavorable, raise a question that might, have been raised before."
Id. at 49.)
75. Johnson v. Hill, supra note 72 (Juror's prior involvement in an accident
was not of such magnitude to affect substantial rights.); Truitt v. Travelers Ins.
Co., supra note 62 (juror's prior back injuries).
76. Consolidated Gas & Equip. Co. v. Carver, supra note 72; Howser v. Pearson,
95 F. Supp. 936 (D.D.C. 1951).
77. Orenberg v. Thecker, supra note 72, at 377-378.
78. Ibid., see also Stanczak v. Penn. R.R. Co., supra note 72; but see, Marvins
Credit, Inc. v. Steward; 133 A.2d 473 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1957).
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It can be too easily assumed that laymen . . . will understand
words and terms of art customarily used by lawyers and judges...
many such words are not well understood by lawyers and judges
themselves. It would be a violent assumption that such laymen
will be alert to give considered answers to questions containing
several such words or terms. . . . Many lawyers . . . will under-
stand the trepidation of a layman who, for perhaps the first time
in his life, occupies the spotlighted position of the jury box; and
his reluctance to discuss with able counsel, abstract legal issues
such as those implicit in the questions propounded in the present
case.
The leading case in the area where a new trial was granted for
juror concealment of information is Consolidated Gas & Equip. Co. v.
Carver."9 In this case, counsel inquired whether any members of the
jury had ever instituted or defended against a law suit for personal
injuries, and a juror who had an action pending at the time for injuries
similar to those sustained by the plaintiff remained silent and ulti-
mately served as foreman. The Tenth Circuit held that the possibility
that the juror would be subject, in some degree, to the extraneous
influence of his own injury, coupled with the pendency of his own
action, rendered him incompetent and the effect of his silence was to
deceive and mislead the court and the litigants in respect to his com-
petency. Thus, upon discovery of this incompetency, a party litigant
was entitled to relief from a judgment entered against him. It is also
worthy to note that notwithstanding that additional inquiries would
have revealed facts which would have eliminated this juror for cause, 80
the court stated that the juror's silence "had the effect of nullifying the
right of peremptory challenge."
In a subsequent case, Lay v. J. M. McDonald,"' the holding in
Carver was restrictively interpreted as meaning that per se prejudice
is established where there is "similarity" in "circumstances which are
not remote in time." As to the right of peremptory challenge, Lay
summarily dismissed any notion of prejudice in this regard with the
ingenuous remark that it was not manifest that such a challenge would
have been exercised.
It is, submitted that the right of peremptory challenge should not
be viewed too lightly by the courts. The ruling in Orenberg apparently
overlooks this right and places the intolerable burden on counsel of
phrasing his questions in language that clearly may be earmarked as
non-legalistic and within the realm of understanding of each of the
79. Supra note 72.
80. Id. at 115.
81. Supra note 72, at 40. Note that a recommended procedure is set forth hereih
to establish whether or not a false answer was given.
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panelists. But, if, as that court credently signifies, each panelist is SO
pervaded with "trepidation," is it not improbable that a panelist will
respond to such a query in any event? The burden is properly placed,
not on counsel, but on the panel to speak out if the phraseology is
unclear, and if not there, then on the courts to at least scrutinize the
questions propounded for probable jury understanding. To hold that
counsel acts at his peril in this regard, nullifies the right to peremptory
challenge that Carver speaks of and ultimately leads to a derogation
of the rights afforded by the Judicial Code and inherent in the
seventh amendment.
In a similar vein, it is further submitted that counsel's explanation
should be limited to a showing that he had no knowledge at the trial
level of the information later disclosed; that a juror failed in his duty
to make full and truthful answers to the questions propounded; anl
that a truthful answer might have established prejudice or redounded
to the disqualification of the juror. To require a showing of an unjust
verdict or of actual bias would substantially curtail the right of the
parties to reject jurors for prejudice, actual or imagined.
CONCLUSION
The desirability of trial by jury has been constantly debated with
relatively little direct attention being afforded to its component parts,
among which is the voir dire examination. This author is in agree-
ment with those who feel that the jury system is far from inefficient
and is of the firm opinion that it continues to remain the best available
method for determining truth in a controversy. It is further felt that
less displeasure, and more esteem, would be voiced toward the jury
system if more time and attention were devoted to improving the
caliber, the process of selection, and the substantive and procedural
area of rejection of jurors. Without such improvement from within,
an incessant dissatisfaction with the whole will continue to affect the
smooth and proper operation of its integral parts.
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